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 1 
Summary 
The governing body of European football, UEFA, recently adopted the 
Financial Fair play rules as part of the previously existing Club Licensing 
system. The core provision of the Financial Fair Play rules are the break-
even requirement, which forces the European football clubs to live within 
their means.  
 
The purpose of the thesis is to analyze whether the Financial Fair Play rules 
are compatible with EU law, especially the competition provisions, 
regulated in Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU and the free movement of 
workers, regulated in Article 45 TFEU. In order to make this analyze, sport-
related case law has been emphasized and thoroughly examined, since the 
principles of EU sports law can only be derived from said case law. These 
principles have then been applied to the Financial Fair play rules. 
 
The thesis concludes that the Financial Fair Play rules would probably pass 
the Wouters test and thereby they would not constitute a restrictive 
agreement within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU. Also, on the same 
merits, the rules would probably meet the objective justification grounds 
regarding free movement of workers and therefore be compatible with 
Article 45 TFEU. If the Financial Fair Play rules would not pass the 
Wouters test, they would have a good chance of gaining exemption under 
Article 101(3) TFEU but they would still be deemed incompatible with 
Article 45 TFEU. Furthermore, the Financial Fair Play rules are not likely to 
constitute abuse of a dominant position, and therefore they are not 
prohibited by Article 102 TFEU. However, the thesis also concludes that 
one should be vary of drawing definite conclusions in these matters, since 
the compatibility with EU law of rules issued by sport governing bodies 
must be examined on a case by case basis, with a proportionality test being 
one of the key features. 
 
Even though the Financial Fair Play rules likely are considered to be 
compatible with EU law, it is problematic that they supposedly will not 
promote competitive balance. Hopefully, that issue will be addressed in the 
future, for example by complementing the rules with other measures.    
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Sammanfattning 
Det styrande organet i europeisk fotboll, UEFA, har nyligen introducerat 
Financial Fair Play-regler som en del av det sedan tidigare existerande Club 
Licensing-systemet. Kärnan i Financial Fair Play reglerna är ett break-even-
krav som tvingar de europeiska fotbollsklubbarna att leva efter sina resurser.  
 
Uppsatsens syfte är att analysera om Financial Fair Play-reglerna är 
förenliga med EU-rätten. Av särskilt intresse är EU-rättens 
konkurrensrättsliga regler, som återfinns i Artikel 101 FEUF och Artikel 
102 FEUF, samt regeln gällande fri rörlighet för arbetstagare, som återfinns 
i Artikel 45 FEUF. För att genomföra analysen på ett relevant sätt har 
sportrelaterad praxis legat i fokus och studerats ingående, eftersom 
principerna om EU-rättens relation till sport endast kan utläsas från nämda 
praxis. Dessa principer har sedan tillämpats på Financial Fair Play-reglerna. 
 
I uppsatsen dras slutsatsen att Financial Fair Play-reglerna förmodligen 
skulle klara Wouters-testet och därmed inte utgöra en 
konkurrensbegränsning under Artikel 101(1) FEUF. På samma sätt skulle 
reglerna förmodligen vara objektivt försvarbara gällande den fria rörligheten 
för arbetstagare och därför vara förenliga med Artikel 45 FEUF.  Om 
Financial Fair Play-reglerna inte skulle klara Wouters-testet så skulle de ha 
en god chans att möta kriterierna för det undantag som återfinns i Artikel 
101(3) FEUF. Dock skulle de i så fall ändå inte vara förenliga med Artikel 
45 FEUF. Vidare så bör Financial Fair Play-reglerna inte utgöra missbruk 
av en dominerande ställning under Artikel 102 FEUF. Det ska dock påpekas 
att man bör vara försiktig med att dra definitiva slutsatser i sådana här fall, 
eftersom förenligheten med EU-rätten gällande regler utfärdade av styrande 
sportorgan måste undersökas ifrån fall till fall, då ett proportionalitetstest är 
ett utav nyckelverktygen. 
 
Trots att Financial Fair Play-reglerna troligtvis är förenliga med EU-rätten 
är det problematiskt att reglerna förmodligen inte kommer att förbättra 
konkurrensen mellan klubbarna. Förhoppningsvis kommer detta att åtgärdas 
i framtiden, till exempel genom att reglerna kompletteras med fler åtgärder.  
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Abbreviations 
EU European Union 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UEFA The Union of the European Football Associations  
FIFA International Federation of Association Football 
URBSFA Royal Belgian Football Association 
CFCB Club Financial Control Body 
IOC International Olympic Committee 
FINA Fédération Internationale de Natation Amateur 
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1 Introduction  
Even though professional football in Europe has developed into a huge 
industry during the last decades and despite steady rising of incomes for the 
European clubs, there have been extensive discussions about financial crisis 
in the European football and even concerns about a financial bubble about to 
burst.
1
 According to the UEFA club licensing benchmark report for the 
financial year 2011, 55% of the clubs participating in the European top 
divisions where loss-making and 38% reported negative equity.
2
 The same 
figures for 2010 were 56% and 36% respectively.
3
 UEFA, an association of 
national associations and the governing body of European football, has 
concluded that the inflationary spending on salaries and transfer fees of the 
European football clubs is the root to this problem.
4
 With this in mind, it is 
not surprising that the possibility of introducing different cost control 
mechanisms has been a highly topical issue for the stakeholders in European 
football the last decade. 
 
UEFA holds jurisdiction over football played in Europe and organizes some 
of the most profitable and prestigious European tournaments, including 
UEFA Champions League and Europa League. Since 2004, European 
football clubs that want to participate in the UEFA club competitions must 
qualify for an UEFA license. In order to do that, the clubs needed to fulfill 
some minimum standards (covering the areas of sporting, infrastructure, 
personnel, legal and financial matters) set out in the UEFA Club Licensing 
system. In 2010, UEFA introduced the UEFA Financial Fair Play 
regulations (Financial Fair Play rules), which are an extension of the UEFA 
Club Licensing, essentially adding requirements concerning solvency and 
financing. The core of the Financial Fair Play rules is the break-even 
requirement. In order for a club to comply with this requirement, relevant 
expenses cannot exceed relevant incomes in excess of the acceptable 
deviation. 
 
As stated above, the UEFA license only applies to the UEFA club 
competitions and not to the domestic leagues. However, the most 
competitive clubs of Europe will have to comply with the Financial Fair 
Play rules in order to receive an UEFA license. For example, in February 
2013, the clubs in the English Premier League announced that they had 
reached an agreement in principle to a system of enhanced financial 
regulations. These regulations has some strong resemblance to the Financial 
Fair Play rules but also include restrictions on the amount of increased 
                                                 
1
 Conn, D., Uefa's Fair Play Rules Will Help Clubs Rein in Spending, 25.01.2012. 
2
 Peery, S., Leach, S. UEFA The European Club Licensing Benchmarking Report Financial 
Year 2011.  
3
 Peery, S., Leach, S. The European Club Footballing Landscape. Club Licensing 
Benchmarking Report Financial Year 2010. 
4
 UEFA. Financial Fair Play. 
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Premier League Central Funds that can be used to increase player wage 
costs in the next couple of years.
5
   
 
1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze whether the Financial Fair Play rules 
are compatible with EU law. In doing so, the break-even requirement 
included in the Financial Fair Play rules will be most developed upon, since 
it could be considered to represent the core of the Financial Fair Play rules 
and it is also the most complex requirement from a legal viewpoint. The 
thesis aims to describe and analyze the applicable regulations and relevant 
case law concerning competition law and internal market freedoms in order 
to be able to make that assessment. As part of the purpose of the thesis, 
other forms of cost control mechanisms will be briefly examined to see if 
there are alternative measures that are more suitable than the Financial Fair 
Play Rules. 
 
My intention is that this thesis should be written in a way that will help the 
actors in the football arena to understand the legal problems existing in the 
complex relationship between different cost control mechanisms and EU 
law. 
1.2 Method 
The method chosen for this thesis is the traditional legal method, also 
known as the dogmatic method. In order to interpret and systemize 
applicable law and find the answer to the given problem, material such as 
legislation, case law, official documents and doctrine will be assigned value 
and be analyzed.  
 
Before the introduction of Article 165 in the Treaty of the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU), there was no legal instrument that applied 
exclusively or specifically to sports. However, sport-related activities have 
been analyzed in a number of judgments by the Court of Justice of the EU 
(the Court). Therefore, the relevant case law that has developed when it 
comes to the relationship between sports and EU law plays a vital part in the 
assessment of the compatibility of the Financial Fair Play rules with EU 
law. 
 
In order to investigate applicable law in the area of cost control mechanisms 
in professional football, the thesis will touch upon issues regarding the 
objective of rules issued by governing sport bodies, economic aspect of such 
rules and references to different jurisdictions where such rules are used. 
However, this does not mean that other perspectives such as law and politics 
and law and economics or certain comparisons will not be used since these 
                                                 
5
 The New Financial Rules Agreed by Clubs Explained, 07.02.2013. 
 7 
issues are of importance when deciding how a court of law can be expected 
to rule.   
 
1.3 Delimitations 
Even though the UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play regulations 
consist of a wide range of licensing conditions, the focus of this thesis will 
be on the break-even requirement. Some interesting requirements, such as 
clubs having to settle their liabilities on a timely basis (a requirement that 
Malaga recently breached and therefore where banned from future 
competition) will not be developed.  
 
Furthermore, this being a thesis in the subject of law, the analysis of what 
type of cost control mechanism the Financial Fair Play rules formally 
constitute is of little importance and will therefore not be examined. This 
cost control mechanism will be treated as separate from the other types of 
cost control mechanisms. 
 
Also, for the educational purposes of this thesis, I will use terms and Article 
numbers as they are today. For example, the term Court of Justice of the EU 
will be used instead of European Court of Justice. 
 
1.4 Disposition 
An introduction to the thesis can be found in the first chapter. In the second 
chapter, the different cost control measures that exist in sports will be 
briefly touched upon as well as the basics of the Financial Fair Play rules 
being developed in more detail. The third chapter contains the identification 
of applicable law, the provisions that would be relevant in a potential 
challenge of the Financial Fair Play rules and the relevant case law. In the 
fourth chapter, the analysis whether the Financial Fair Play Rules are 
compatible with EU law will be conducted. The final fifth chapter contains 
the concluding remarks.  
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2 Cost control mechanisms in 
sport 
Salary caps are arguably the most famous type of cost control mechanisms 
in sport and it sets a limit on the amount of money a club can spend on 
player salaries.
6
 However, since top division clubs across Europe on average 
spend 65% of their overall share of revenue on wages and social costs, 38% 
of the clubs spend more than 70% and 13% of the clubs spend more than 
100%, any form of cost control mechanism relating to football must target 
wages as it is the primary cost for football clubs.
7
 
 
Cost control mechanisms in sport usually have the objective to promote 
competitive balance and to maintain financial sustainability. From an 
economic perspective though, it may also be viewed upon as a way for the 
owners to extract rents on the expense of the players and thereby transfer 
player rents back to ownership through a collusive agreement.
8
 Also, it can 
be argued that sport leagues should be viewed as rent seeking contests 
(since they exhibit a “fix supply of winning”) where success depends on the 
relative share of total resources devoted to competition.
9
   
 
Regulations in professional team sports have been commonly used to battle 
the dangers of competitive imbalance and the escalation of player wages. 
This is especially true when it comes to American professional team sports. 
The reserve clause in the US that was abolished 1976 in favour of free 
agency, due to player unions and antitrust threats, is one example.
10
 
Professional football in Europe has seen prominent examples, such as the 
transfer rules restricting free movement of players before they were 
abolished due to the Bosman ruling.
11
 The first time salary caps were 
introduced in sport was when the National Basketball Association (NBA) 
implemented it for the 1984-1985 season. Since then, cost control 
mechanisms in sports have become commonplace and are today in effect in 
professional team sports all around the world. Noticeable examples are all 
the major leagues in the US, such as the Nation Football League (NFL), the 
Major League Baseball (MLB) and the Major League Soccer (MLS), 
                                                 
6
 Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2007) 935, accompanying Commission 
White Paper on Sport, COM (2007) 391 final (July 11, 2007), p. 77. Dietl, H., Helmut M., 
Lang, M., Rathke, A., 2009. “The Effect of Salary Caps in Professional Team Sports on 
Social Welfare”, p. 2. 
7
 Peery, S., Leach, S. UEFA The European Club Licensing Benchmarking Report Financial 
Year 2011, p. 97. Peeters, T., Szymansky, S., 2012. “Vertical restraint in soccer: Financial 
Fair Play and English Premier League”, p. 27. 
8
 Dietl, H., Helmut M., Lang, M., Rathke, A., supra note 6. Peeters, Szymansky, supra note 
7, p. 3 
9
 Peeters, Szymansky, supra note 7, p. 8. 
10
 Dietl, H., Franck, E., Lang M., Rathke, A., 2010. “Salary Cap Regulation in Professional 
Team Sports”, p. 2. 
11
 Case C-415/93 URBSFA v. Bosman ECR 1995 I-4921. 
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Australian leagues, such as the Australian Football League, the National 
Rugby League and A-League Soccer and European leagues such as the 
Kontinental Hockey League (KHL) and different Rugby leagues.
12
 
 
The idea of introducing cost control mechanisms in European football has 
been up for discussion for a long time. The investigation leading to the 
UEFA Club Licensing system considered the possibility of introducing a 
salary cap but found it infeasible and in 2003, 14 of the leading clubs in 
European football, organized as the so-called G14, agreed to limit spending 
on team salaries to 70% of revenues. Whether this agreement was never put 
in place or if the clubs simply failed to live up to the agreement, due to a 
lack of enforcement mechanisms, seems to be up for debate. 
13
  
 
2.1 Salary caps 
As mentioned earlier, a salary cap is as a limit on the amount of money a 
club can spend on player salaries. The cap is commonly calculated as a 
percentage of average annual league revenues and limits the possibility for 
clubs to invest in player talent. The cap is often a fixed sum, since leagues 
usually calculate the cap on the basis of the revenues for the preceding 
season. Salary caps have existed in American leagues for several decades 
and are now, in contrary to earlier regulations, an established part of the 
system of labor relations.
 14
  
 
There are mainly two types of salary caps. A hard cap imposes a fixed 
amount on the spending of all clubs and they may never exceed that limit. A 
soft cap, on the other hand, also imposes a fixed amount of spending of all 
clubs but they may exceed that limit under certain conditions, as for 
example to keep a player that has been with the team for a long time.
15
 
2.2 Luxury taxes 
A luxury tax, sometimes also referred to as a competitive balance tax, is a 
surcharge on the aggregate payroll of a sports team that exceeds a 
predetermined limit. The purpose is to slow the growth of salaries and to 
promote competitive balance by preventing large-market teams from signing 
all of the top players within a league. The money derived from this tax is 
distributed among the financially weaker teams.
16
 
 
                                                 
12
 Dietl, H., Helmut M., Lang, M., Rathke, A., supra note 6, at p. 2. 
13
 Peeters, Szymansky, supra note 7, p. 6. Lindholm, J., 2011. “The Problem With Salary 
Caps Under European Union Law: The Case Against Financial Fair Play”, p. 194. 
14
 Dietl, H., Helmut M., Lang, M., Rathke, A., supra note 6. 
15
 Parrish, R., Garcia, B., Miettinen, S., Siekmann, R., 2010. “The Lisbon Treaty and EU 
Sports Policy” p. 33. Lindholm, supra note 13, p. 194. 
16
 Dietl, H., Lang, M., Werner, S., 2010. “The Effect of Luxury Taxes on Competitive 
Balance, Club Profits, and Social Welfare in Sports Leagues”, p, 2.  
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2.3 Financial Fair Play rules 
2.3.1 Objectives 
The objectives of the UEFA Club Licensing system are set out in Article 2 
of the UEFA Club licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations, which are 
basically a combination of the objectives of the former UEFA Club 
Licensing system and the Financial Fair Play rules.
17
 The Financial Fair 
Play rules “aim to achieve financial fair play in UEFA club competitions 
and in particular:  
a) to improve the economic and financial capability of the clubs, increasing 
their transparency and credibility; 
b) to place the necessary importance on the protection of creditors and to 
ensure that clubs settle their liabilities with players, social/tax authorities 
and other clubs punctually;  
c) to introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finances;  
d) to encourage clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues; 
e) to encourage responsible spending for the long-term benefit of football; 
f) to protect the long-term viability and sustainability of European club 
football.”18  
However, these objectives can only be properly understood when read in 
combination with the more general objectives of the licensing rules, being 
for example “to further promote and continuously improve the standard of 
all aspects of football in Europe and to give continued priority to the 
training and care of young players in every club”, “to adapt clubs’ sporting 
infrastructure to provide players, spectators and media representatives with 
suitable, well-equipped and safe facilities” and “to protect the integrity and 
smooth running of the UEFA club competitions”.19 
 
It is interesting to note that competitive balance is not among the objectives 
of the Financial Fair Play rules, as opposed to most other cost control 
measures. Instead the Financial Fair Play rules could be argued to pursue 
other objectives, with questions of fairness, financial soundness as a mean to 
ensure the long-term viability of football, promoting long-term investments 
and protecting the wider interests of football being of paramount 
importance.
20
 However, from a more cynical point of view, the purpose of 
the break-even regulation could also be seen as a way for football clubs and 
UEFA to increase profitability and extract rents at the expense of the 
players.
21
 
 
                                                 
17
 UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations, Article 2. 
18
 Id, Article 2(2). 
19
 Id, Article 2(1). 
20
 Parrish, Garcia, Miettinen, Siekmann, supra note 15, p. 33. Geey, D., 2011. “The UEFA 
Financial Fair Play Rules: a difficult balancing act”, para. 2. Lindholm, supra note 13, p. 
197. Joint statement by Vice-President Joaquín Almunia and President Michel Platini, p. 2. 
21
 Peeters, Szymansky, supra note 7, p. 3. 
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2.3.2 Basic rules 
The scope of the break-even requirement is defined in Article 57 and the 
break-even requirements are regulated in Articles 58 to 63 and further 
developed in the Annexes X and XI. Within the scope of this thesis, there is 
no place for a detailed discussion about the rules or to describe the 
regulations in detail, but in order to obtain a license for a UEFA club 
competition, clubs must fulfill the break-even requirement. In short, the 
clubs must show, by submitting their financial statements and underlying 
accounting records, that their break-even results (determined by calculating 
the difference between relevant incomes and relevant expenses) for a 
specific monitoring period are positive, or within an acceptable deviation. 
The acceptable deviation is €5M for each monitoring period but during a 
phasing period, an excess of up to €45M for each monitoring period will be 
allowed, under certain conditions, if such excess is entirely covered by 
contributions from equity participants and/or related parties. That is the case 
if, for example, an owner exchanges cash for shares.
22
 
 
Some categories of expenditures are encouraged by the Financial Fair Play 
rules, since the expenses are excluded from the calculation of the break-even 
result. Expenditure on youth development activities and expenditure on 
community development activities are examples of such categories. 
Likewise, some categories of income do not count in full when calculating 
the break-even result. Income transactions with related parties above fair 
value is one example of such a category. If such a transaction takes place, 
only the estimated fair value counts. Fair value is defined as “the amount for 
which an asset could be exchanged, or a liability settled, between 
knowledgeable willing parties in an arm’s length transaction”.23 The 
purpose of the provisions regarding related party transactions is to hinder 
owners of clubs from artificially inflating their clubs revenues in order to 
fulfill the break-even requirement. Without these provisions, the club 
owners could, for example, sign lucrative sponsorship deals, that would be 
disproportionally favorable for the clubs, in order to circumvent the 
Financial Fair Play rules.
24
  
 
Naturally, in order to have a well-functioning licensing system, there has to 
be enforcement mechanisms in place. Responsible for overseeing the 
application of the UEFA Club Licensing System and Financial Fair Play 
Regulations is the Club Financial Control Body (CFCB). The CFCB is 
competent to impose disciplinary measures in the case of non-fulfillment of 
the requirements, and to decide on cases relating to clubs’ eligibility for 
UEFA club competitions. The CFCB is divided into two chambers. The 
investigatory chamber is responsible for the investigation stage of the 
proceedings and the adjudicatory chamber is responsible for the judgment 
stage of the proceedings. The disciplinary measures at hand are extensive 
and range from a warning to disqualification from competitions in progress 
                                                 
22
 UEFA Club licensing et. al., supra note 17, Articles 3 and 57-63. 
23
 Id, Annex X. 
24
 Geey, et. al. supra note 24, para. 49. 
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and/or exclusion from future competitions and ultimately withdrawal of a 
title or award. 
25
 
 
2.3.3 Comments 
The effect of the Financial Fair Play rules has been examined in a few 
studies. Football clubs are generally considered to be win maximizers 
engaged in a form of rent-seeking contest.
 26
 Hence, as one study shows, the 
Financial Fair Play rules are expected to impact almost entirely on costs, 
which in football clubs primarily take the form of wages. In case the 
Financial Fair Play rules had been applied fully in the English Premier 
League in the 2009/10 season, it is estimated that the wage to turnover ratios 
would have fallen by as much as 15%.
27
 It is also often argued that the 
Financial Fair Play rules will significantly reduce competitive balance in 
European football.
28
  
 
It is clear that one of the main objectives of this type of cost control 
mechanism is to ensure financial stability. Thereby, the aim is not to 
promote competitive balance, but rather to cut costs. UEFA wants the 
European football clubs to be self-sustainable, to balance their books and to 
compete within their means. This correlates with the belief of UEFA that 
club owners injecting money leads to bidding wars between clubs for 
players, which has caused a transfer fee and wage inflation leading to 
financial unsustainability.
29
 
 
In order to understand the difficulty of introducing cost control mechanisms 
in European football, one must have a basic understanding of the way the 
European system of sport governing bodies work. As opposed to the major 
leagues in North America, where player unions and owners represent the 
two sides of the relevant labor market, the organization of European sport is 
characterized by a monopolistic pyramid structure with large stakeholder 
diversity. The sport governing bodies need to balance the interests of all 
stakeholders. Also, in the European football pyramid for example, there is a 
significant market heterogeneity considering that it includes all European 
football competitions with all their different preconditions.
30
 Traditionally, 
European football has used an open system in which sporting success 
determines access to competitions, for example through promotion and 
relegation but the Financial Fair Play rules are different in the sense that it 
uses financial criteria.
31
 Nevertheless, according to the Commission and 
                                                 
25
 Procedural rules governing the UEFA Club Financial Control Body”. 
26
 Peeters, Szymansky, supra note 7. Sass, M. 2012. “Long-term Competitive Balance 
under UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations”. 
27
 Peeters, Szymansky, supra note 7, p. 27-28. 
28
 Id., p. 7. Sass, supra note 26, p. 10. Storm, R., Nielsen, K., 2012. “Soft Budget 
Constraints in Professional Football”, p. 196. 
29
 Geey, supra note 24, para. 2. 
30
 Dietl, Franck, Lang, Rathke, supra note 10, p. 4-5; Commission White Paper on Sport, 
supra note 6, p. 36. 
31
 Parrish, Garcia, Miettinen, Siekmann, supra note 15, p. 33. 
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UEFA, the principles of the Financial Fair Play rules have been developed 
in cooperation with, and are fully supported by, all football stakeholders.
32
  
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 Joint statement, supra note 20, p. 1. 
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3 Sport and EU law 
3.1 The application of EU law to sport 
First of all, it is important to note that the EU has no general regulatory 
competence and that the only competences and powers attributed to it stems 
from its treaties. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, that entered into force in 
December 2009, the treaties did not mention sport at all and the EU had 
therefore no explicit power in the field of sport.
33
 Instead, European sports 
law is primarily based on the “judge-made law” of the Court of Justice of 
the EU, with its jurisprudence including the landmark cases such as 
Walrave
34
, Bosman
35
 and Meca-Medina
36
. Over time, a body of case law 
has been established that is based on the underlying principle of respect for 
the autonomy of the sports associations and their rules and decisions, as 
long as they are sustainable in the light of the particular characteristics of 
the sport. In other words, sporting rules and decisions can be granted 
exceptions to EU law if they are justifiable and proportional.
37
 The specific 
characteristics of sports are often referred to as the ”specificity of sport” and 
have been recognized and taken into account both by the European Courts 
and the Commission. However, the specificity of sport cannot justify a 
general exemption from the application of EU law.
38
 There could even be 
argued that sport has always been treated as special by EU law and that it 
has been given a conditional autonomy in the sense that it has to respect the 
core norms of the Treaty but never has been treated as a normal industry by 
the Court or the Commission.
39
   
 
Starting with its first great case in sport, the Walrave case, the Court of 
Justice of the EU has consistently subjected sport to EU law in so far it 
constitutes an economic activity.
40
 Hence, it has long been established that 
in so far sport constitutes an economic activity, it falls within the scope of 
the Treaty and sporting practices must comply with the rules contained 
therein, most notably competition law and internal market freedoms.
41
 The 
                                                 
33
 Weatherill, S. 2011. ”EU Sports Law: the Effect of the Lisbon Treaty”, p. 1. 
34
 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch v. Union Cycliste Internationale ECR 1974, 1405. 
35
 Bosman, supra note 11. 
36
 Case C-519/04 P David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v. Commission ECR 2006 I-
6991. 
37
 Siekmann, R., Soek, J. 2012. “Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law”, p. 383-384. 
38
 Commission White Paper on Sport, supra note 6, p. 13. 
39
 Weatherill, supra note 33, p. 3. 
40
 Walrave and Koch, supra note 34, para. 4. Case 13/76 Donà v. Mantero ECR 1976 1333, 
para. 12 Bosman, supra note 11, para. 73. Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Christelle 
Deliège v. Ligue francophone de judo etc. ECR 2000 I-2549, para. 41. Case C-176/96 
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court has confirmed on several occasions that this is highly relevant when it 
comes to regulations issued by the governing bodies of football.
42
 The court 
has also consistently held that “where a sporting activity takes the form of 
gainful employment or the provision of services for remuneration, which is 
true of the activities of semi-professional or professional sportsmen, it falls, 
more specifically, within the scope of Article 45 TFEU”.43 In Bosman, the 
Court commented on the “the difficulty of severing the economic aspects 
from the sporting aspects of football”.44 That is a fair point, since most 
sporting practices connected to professional sport in general, and perhaps 
football in particular, has an economic impact.
45
 
 
Another principle from the Walrave case was that it exists sporting rules 
that are “of purely sporting interest and as such has nothing to do with 
economic activity”.46 Over the years, this principle has often been promoted 
by sport governing bodies but the non-existence of a widespread exemption 
for “purely sporting rules” should, if not sooner, be clear after Meca-
Medina.
47
 The court stated that “the mere fact that a rule is purely sporting 
in nature does not have the effect of removing from the scope of the Treaty 
the person engaging in the activity governed by that rule or the body which 
has laid it down” and that “if the sporting activity in question falls within 
the scope of the Treaty, the conditions for engaging in it are then subject to 
all the obligations which result from the various provisions of the Treaty. It 
follows that the rules which govern that activity must satisfy the 
requirements of those provisions, which, in particular, seek to ensure 
freedom of movement for workers, freedom of establishment, freedom to 
provide services, or competition”.48 Therefore, a practice that is of a 
sporting nature, or even purely sporting in intent, will be tested against the 
demands of EU trade law if it exerts economic effects.
49
 
 
Furthermore, it is clear from the case law that rules adopted by sporting 
associations and federations, both on national and on international level, are 
subject to EU law even though they are not rules adopted by public 
authorities.
50
 For example, the Court stated in Bernard that “it is settled case 
law that Article 45 TFEU extends not only to the actions of public 
authorities but also to rules of any other nature aimed at regulating gainful 
employment in a collective manner”51 and in Meca-Medina, the Court held 
that rules established by sport federations “must be limited to what is 
necessary to ensure the proper conduct of competitive sport”.52 The latter 
formulation has two implications. First of all, it is a confirmation of the 
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aforementioned conditional autonomy of sport federations under EU law, 
but it also highlights the need for a case-by-case examination of the 
compatibility of sporting practices with the Treaty. In order words, there 
does not exist a blanket exemption or general guidelines when it comes to 
applying EU law to sporting rules.
53
  
 
The Financial Fair Play Rules are part of the licensing system for clubs, 
which is one of the legal issues regarding the organization of sport. 
Licensing refers to different criteria established by sports federations or 
leagues that clubs must adhere to in order to be allowed to participate in 
competitions. In theory, licensing requirements may amount to a barrier to 
entry to the market and risk being captured within the scope of Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU. There is also a risk that licensing requirements would 
restrict the right to free movement of players, contained in Article 45 TFEU, 
if an acquiring club could not recruit new labour due to these requirements.
 
54
 However, the Commission has stated that it “acknowledges the usefulness 
of robust licensing systems for professional clubs at European and national 
levels as a tool for promoting good governance in sport” but also that “such 
systems must be compatible with competition and internal market 
provisions and may not go beyond what is necessary for the pursuit of a 
legitimate objective relating to the proper organization and conduct of 
sport.”55 The Commission has also stated that “In the light of Meca-Medina, 
it appears that a considerable number of organizational sporting rules, 
namely all those that determine the conditions for professional athletes, 
teams or clubs to engage in sporting activity as an economic activity, are 
subject to scrutiny under the antitrust provisions of the Treaty”.56 As follows 
of this reasoning, the Financial Fair Play Rules could potentially be 
challenged under Article 101 TFEU, Article 102 TFEU and Article 45 
TFEU on the grounds that they distort or restrict competition, constitute 
abuse of a dominant position or restrict the free movement of workers.
57
  
 
In December 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, sport was for 
the first time recognized as an area in which the EU had the authority to 
intervene.
58
 Article 165 TFEU states that “the Union shall contribute to the 
promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific 
nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and 
educational function”. Even though that is a milestone in the relationship 
between EU law and sports, the Article is cautiously formulated and is 
intended for EU to play a subsidiary role compared to the Member states 
and the governing bodies in sport. It seems to be a common opinion that the 
introduction of sport into the Lisbon Treaty is unlikely to alter the existing 
approach to sport taken by the Court and the Commission.
 59
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3.2 Relevant provisions 
As already mentioned, the Financial Fair Play Rules can potentially be 
challenged under Article 101 TFEU, Article 102 TFEU and Article 45 
TFEU. 
 
Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits “all agreements between undertakings, 
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which 
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
internal market”.  
 
Also, according to Article 101(2) TFEU “any agreements or decisions 
prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void”.  
 
However, Article 101 (3) TFEU states that “The provisions of paragraph 1 
may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:  
— any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings,  
— any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings,  
— any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,  
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair 
share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:  
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;  
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in 
respect of a substantial part of the products in question.   
 
Article 102 TFEU states that ”any abuse by one or more undertakings of a 
dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it 
shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it 
may affect trade between Member States.” 
 
According to Article 45 (1) TFEU “Freedom of movement for workers shall 
be secured within the Union.” 
 
Also, Article 45 (2) TFEU states that “Such freedom of movement shall 
entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between 
workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and 
other conditions of work and employment.” 
 
 18 
3.3 Relevant case law 
3.3.1 Sport and competition in case law 
 
One of the reasons that the landmark Meca-Medina ruling is so important, is 
because the Court of Justice of the EU for the first time reasoned on the 
application of Article 101 TFEU and Article 102 TFEU to organizational 
sporting rules, while before, the Court had decided cases on the basis of 
other provisions, such as the free movement of workers.
60
 
 
The case concerned a complaint by two professional long distance 
swimmers against a doping sanction imposed on them after a failed test. The 
swimmers challenged the compatibility with Articles 101 TFEU and 102 
TFEU of the anti-doping rules adopted by the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) and implemented by the swimming governing body 
Fédération Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA). The challenge was 
founded on the accusation that the setting of the prescribed doping limit was 
a concerted practice between the IOC and the 27 laboratories accredited by 
it, that the limit was scientifically unfounded and could lead to the exclusion 
of innocent or merely negligent athletes.
61
 
 
The Court stated that engagement in a sporting activity “must be assessed in 
the light of the Treaty provisions relating to competition, it will be necessary 
to determine, given the specific requirements of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC 
(now Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU), whether the rules which govern 
that activity emanate from an undertaking, whether the latter restricts 
competition or abuses its dominant position, and whether that restriction or 
that abuse affects trade between Member States.”62 
 
Furthermore, the Court stated that “Not every agreement between 
undertakings or every decision of an association of undertakings which 
restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them necessarily 
falls within the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) EC (now Article 
101(1) TFEU). For the purposes of application of that provision to a 
particular case, account must first of all be taken of the overall context in 
which the decision of the association of undertakings was taken or produces 
its effects and, more specifically, of its objectives. It has then to be 
considered whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are 
inherent in the pursuit of those objectives… and are proportionate to 
them”.63 This line of reasoning was established in the Wouters case.64 
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In applying this “Wouters test” to the sporting rules at hand in Meca-
Medina, the Court concluded that they did not infringe EU competition law, 
since they had a legitimate objective “to combat doping in order for 
competitive sport to be conducted fairly” and was “inherent in the 
organisation and proper conduct of competitive sport and its very purpose is 
to ensure healthy rivalry between athletes”.65 The Court also recognized that 
the sanctions attached to the anti-doping rules “are capable of producing 
adverse effects on competition” and that “in order not to be covered by the 
prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) EC (now Article 101(1) TFEU), the 
restrictions thus imposed by those rules must be limited to what is necessary 
to ensure the proper conduct of competitive sport”.66 The Court found the 
rules to be proportionate both in regard to the set threshold for the banned 
substance and the severity of the sanctions.
67
  
 
In its White Paper on Sport, the Commission explained its methodological 
approach, based on the ruling in Meca-Medina, when it comes to assessing 
whether a rule relating to the organization of sport and adopted by a sport 
association infringes Article 101 TFEU and/or Article 102 TFEU.
68
 In 
evaluating the approach taken by the Commission, it is worth noticing that 
the White Paper on Sport has met widespread approval in the doctrine.
69
 
  
3.3.2 Sport and free movement of workers in 
case law 
The list of sports cases where the Court of Justice of the EU has applied the 
provisions of free movement to sporting activities is far more extensive than 
the one where the Court has applied competition rules. For the purpose of 
this thesis, only the parts of the rulings that are relevant for the assessment 
of whether the Financial Fair Play rules are in compliance with EU law will 
be examined. 
 
The landmark Bosman ruling concerned a complaint by a Belgian football 
player against the international transfer rules and nationality quotas in club 
competitions, imposed by FIFA and UEFA, due to a failed transfer from a 
Belgian to a French club. The Court held that Article 45 TFEU “applies to 
rules laid down by sporting associations such as URBSFA, FIFA or UEFA, 
which determine the terms on which professional sportsmen can engage in 
gainful employment.”70 Also, the Court stated that “the situation in 
issue…cannot be classified as purely internal”, since Bosman had “entered 
into a contract of employment with a club in another Member State with a 
view to exercising gainful employment in that State” and therefore he had 
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“accepted an offer of employment actually made, within the meaning of 
Article 48(3)(a) (now Article 45(3)(a) TFEU).
71
 
 
Furthermore, the Court held that “provisions which preclude or deter a 
national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin in order to 
exercise his right to freedom of movement therefore constitute an obstacle 
to that freedom even if they apply without regard to the nationality of the 
workers concerned” and that the transfer rules in issue “constitute an 
obstacle to freedom of movement for workers prohibited in principle by 
Article 48 (now Article 45 TFEU) of the Treaty” and that “it could only be 
otherwise if those rules pursued a legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty 
and were justified by pressing reasons of public interest. But even if that 
were so, application of those rules would still have to be such as to ensure 
achievement of the aim in question and not go beyond what is necessary for 
that purpose.”72 These justification grounds follow the line of reasoning in, 
for example, the ruling in Gebhard, which concerned another fundamental 
freedom, namely free movement of services.
73
 
 
In examining the existence of justifications regarding the transfer rules, 
the Court held that “In view of the considerable social importance of 
sporting activities and in particular football in the Community, the aims of 
maintaining a balance between clubs by preserving a certain degree of 
equality and uncertainty as to results and of encouraging the recruitment 
and training of young players must be accepted as legitimate”.74 However, 
the application of the transfer rules in issue could not be considered 
adequate means to achieve those aims.
75
 Also, the Court held that “the 
same aims can be achieved at least as efficiently by other means which do 
not impede freedom of movement for workers”.76 These means included 
the possibility to “determine by a collective wage agreement specified 
limits for the salaries to be paid to the players by the clubs” and 
“redistribution of income”.77 
 
Furthermore, in reviewing the existence of justifications regarding the 
nationality quotas, the Court found that the direct discrimination on grounds 
of nationality was not in compliance with Article 45 TFEU.
78
 Also, 
regarding the argument that the nationality quotas were drawn up in 
collaboration with the Commission, the Court held that “except where such 
powers are expressly conferred upon it, the Commission may not give 
guarantees concerning the compatibility of specific practices with the 
Treaty… In no circumstances does it have the power to authorize practices 
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which are contrary to the Treaty”.79 Thus, the Court ruled that both the 
transfer rules and the nationality quotas in issue where precluded by Article 
45 TFEU. 
 
Other cases regarding the relationship between sport and free movement 
does not, for the purposes of this thesis, require as in depth review as 
Bosman. 
 
In Lehtonen, the Court considered whether transfer rules that where adopted 
by a basketball federation and which imposed certain restrictions regarding 
players previously registered in a federation of another country, complied 
with Article 45 TFEU.
80
 The Court held that “late transfers might be liable 
to change substantially the sporting strength of one or other team in the 
course of the championship, thus calling into question … the proper 
functioning of the championship as a whole”.81 The Court concluded that 
Article 45 TFEU “precludes the application of rules laid down in a Member 
State by sporting associations which prohibit a basketball club from fielding 
players from other Member States in matches in the national championship, 
where they have been transferred after a specified date, if that date is earlier 
than the date which applies to transfers of players from certain non-member 
countries, unless objective reasons concerning only sport as such or relating 
to differences between the position of players from a federation in the 
European zone and that of players from a federation not in that zone justify 
such different treatment.“82 
 
In Deliège, the Court ruled on the compatibility of a judo association’s rules 
with the freedom to provide services, found in Article 56 TFEU.
 
The 
selection rules restricted the number of athletes that could participate in 
international tournaments, which did not involve national teams competing 
against each other, and required them to be authorized by their national 
federations.
83
  
 
The Court held that “in contrast to the rules applicable to the Bosman case, 
the selection rules at issue…do not determine the conditions governing 
access to the labour market by professional sportsmen and do not contain 
nationality clauses” and that “although selection rules…inevitably have the 
effect of limiting the number of participants in a tournament, such a 
limitation is inherent in the conduct of an international high-level sports 
event, which necessarily involves certain selection rules or criteria being 
adopted. Such rules may not therefore in themselves be regarded as 
constituting a restriction on the freedom to provide services”.84 Thus, 
selection rules such at the one in issue, “does not in itself, as long as it 
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derives from a need inherent in the organisation of such a competition, 
constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide services”.85 
 
In Bernard, the first sport-related case after the Lisbon Treaty entered into 
force, the Court considered whether rules, according to which a “joueur 
espoir” (a young player employed as a trainee by a professional club under a 
fixed-term contract) may be ordered to pay damages if, at the end of his 
training period, he signs a professional contract with a club in another 
Member State, was precluded by Article 45 TFEU.
86
 The rules regulating 
the employment of professional football players had the status of a 
collective agreement and action for damages could be brought against the 
“joueur espoir”, according to an article of the French Employment code.87 
 
After confirming that sport is subject to EU law in so far it constitutes an 
economic activity and that professional sportsmen are workers within the 
meaning of Article 45 TFEU, the Court held that rules regulated by 
collective agreements, as other rules aimed at regulating gainful 
employment in a collective manner, falls within the scope of Article 45.
88
 
Also, the Court reaffirmed the principle established in Bosman, that non-
discriminatory measures can constitute an obstacle to freedom of 
movement.
89
 Furthermore, the Court held that “rules, such as those at issue 
in the main proceedings…are likely to discourage that player from 
exercising his right of free movement”, that “even though…such rules do 
not formally prevent the player from signing a professional contract with a 
club in another Member State, it none the less makes the exercise of that 
right less attractive” and that, consequently, “those rules are a restriction on 
freedom of movement for workers guaranteed within the European Union 
by Article 45 TFEU”.90 
 
When examining the justification for restriction of the free movement of 
workers, the Court applied the same principles as in Bosman, which is that 
the measures constituting a restriction have to pursue a legitimate aim, be 
suitable to ensure that said objective is attained and proportional.
91
 
However, the Court added that when considering the suitability and 
proportionality “account must be taken…of the specific characteristics of 
sport in general, and football in particular, and of their social and 
educational function. The relevance of those factors is also corroborated by 
their being mentioned in the second subparagraph of Article 165(1) 
TFEU.”92 
 
The Court accepted the objective of encouraging the recruitment and 
training of young players as legitimate and that the measures where suitable, 
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since “the prospect of receiving training fees is likely to encourage football 
clubs to seek new talent and train young players” However, the Court 
concluded that the measures did not constitute a justified restriction of the 
free movement of workers, because the liability of players to pay damages, 
calculated in a way which is unrelated to the actual costs of the training, 
went beyond what was necessary to obtain the legitimate objective.
93
 
 
3.3.3 Comments 
After examining existing case law, it can hardly be contested that the Court 
of Justice of the EU continuously has taken account of the special 
characteristics of sport and enabled sporting activities to receive a sensitive 
treatment.
94
 
 
The Court has considered justifications for rules that would ordinarily be 
seen as restrictions of competition or free movement. Justificatory grounds 
can be found in the Treaty but the Court has also accepted reference to other 
objective justifications when applying EU law to sporting activities. The 
justificatory grounds in the Treaty can be found in Article 101 (3) TFEU 
regarding competition law and in Article 45 (3) and (4) TFEU regarding free 
movement of workers. The grounds for objective justification cannot be 
found in the Treaty and are instead established in case law.  
 
In competition law, objective justification can explain why a practice is not 
a restriction within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU. Following Meca-
Medina, it is clear that a sporting rule can be objectively justified if it 
pursues a legitimate objective and its restrictive effects are inherent in the 
pursuit of that objective and are proportionate to it. In order to be 
proportional, the sporting rule must be the least restrictive measure. In the 
free movement provisions on the other hand, objective justification does not 
mean that the practice does not constitute a restriction within the meaning of 
these provisions, but that the restriction is justified and thereby compatible 
with these provisions. After the extensive case law regarding this issue, it is 
clear that a sporting rule can be objectively justified if it pursues a legitimate 
objective and is proportional. Naturally, sporting rules must conform to the 
general principles of EU law, such as proportionality, when they are within 
the scope of the Treaty. When assessing whether a sporting rule is 
proportionate in free movement cases, the Court must consider whether the 
rule is suitable to achieve the legitimate objective and does not go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve that objective. Also, in order to be proportional, 
the rule which justifiably restrict free movement must be the least restrictive 
measure.
95
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This legal model allows for a cohabitation of sporting rules and EU law. 
Once it has been established that a sporting activity exerts economic effects, 
it falls within the scope of the Treaty. It is then up to the sport governing 
body to show why sport is different from other industries and why the rule 
at issue must be tolerated. Thus, the grounds of justification may very well 
rely on arguments that are specific to sport.
96
 
 
It follows from the reasoning described above that the sport governing 
bodies have been granted some space to maneuver when adopting rules. The 
Court does not call for abandonment of established patterns of sport 
governance but rather requires adaptation of specific rules not compatible 
with EU law. The concept of a transfer system was, for example, not ruled 
incompatible with EU law in Bosman and Bernard, but those specific 
transfer systems were. Likewise, in Meca-Medina, the specific anti-doping 
rules at issue were not ruled incompatible with EU law, but rules that are 
found excessive in regard of the threshold for the banned substance or the 
severity of the penalties would infringe the competition rules.
97
  
 
Furthermore, it seems clear that Article 165 TFEU is not likely to change 
the way the Court will rule in relation to sporting activities. In Bernard, the 
Court did open up for giving further weight to sports-related arguments but 
it mainly used Article 165 TFEU to corroborate its own case law by 
confirming the legal reasoning in Bosman.
98
  
 
Finally, it is also clear that the methodical approach used by the Court when 
assessing the objective justifications of sport rules in regard to competition 
law and free movement is similar in many ways. In the “White paper plus”, 
the Commission use the wording of the Wouters test applied in Meca-
Medina when describing how to assess the compatibility of sport rules to 
EU law, including free movement of workers.
99
 Also, there has been argued 
in the doctrine that the findings in Meca-Medina, concerning competition, 
can be transposed to the free movement context, that there is a functional 
comparability between the inquiries conducted under these provisions or 
even that the objective justification tests are functionally identical.
100
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4 The Financial Fair Play rules 
and EU law 
4.1 The Financial Fair Play rules and 
Article 101(1) TFEU 
It is clear that sport is subject to EU law in so far it constitutes an economic 
activity, that professional sport constitutes an economic activity and that the 
rules which govern that activity must satisfy the requirements of all the 
obligations which result from the various provisions of the Treaty, for 
example the competition rules. It is also clear that this reasoning applies to 
rules adopted by sport governing bodies.
101
  
 
In order to assess whether the Financial Fair Play rules infringes Article 101 
TFEU, the aforementioned methodological approach, in line with the 
reasoning in Meca-Medina, that the Commission follows will be applied. 
However, for educational reasons, the Wouters test determining if the 
Financial Fair Play rules are justified and thereby fall outside the scope of 
Article 101 TFEU will have its own subchapter. This is because the 
applicability of Article 101 TFEU is likely to rest on this test.
102
 
 
First, it needs to be determined whether the sporting association that 
adopted the rule is an undertaking or an association of undertakings.
103
 It is 
settled case law that the term undertaking has been given a broad 
interpretation, including “every entity engaged in an economic activity, 
regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is 
financed”. For these purposes, any activity consisting of “offering goods or 
services on the market” constitutes an economic activity.104 UEFA, as an 
international football association consisting of national football associations, 
is an undertaking when carrying out activities of economic nature itself but 
may also be referred to as an association of undertakings or an association 
of associations of undertakings when not carrying out economic activity 
itself.
105
 The Financial Fair Play rules concern football clubs, for which the 
practice of football is an economic activity and the national football 
associations are groupings of these football clubs. As UEFA is grouping 
together the national football association, it will in this case constitute an 
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association of undertakings within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU.
106
 
This is also in line with the purpose of including the concept of associations 
of undertakings in Article 101 TFEU, namely to prevent undertakings from 
circumventing the competition rules by forming a common body that 
coordinates their conduct on the market.
107
 
 
Next, it needs to be determined if the rule in question restricts competition 
within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU, that is whether the Financial Fair 
Play rules have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition. 
108
 It can hardly be contested that the Financial 
Fair Play rules restrict the freedom of action of the European football clubs, 
since the break-even requirement forces them to live within their means and 
therefore cannot spend the amount of money that they choose. This may 
limit club expenditure on player wages and result in increasing profitability 
of clubs.
109
 However, if they fulfill the criteria of the Wouters test, they do 
not necessarily constitute a restriction of competition incompatible with the 
common market, within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU.
110
 This will be 
closer examined in chapter 4.3. 
 
Thirdly, it needs to be determined if the rule in question affect trade between 
Member States.
111
 If it does not, the matter remains in the jurisdiction of the 
relevant Member State. Since the Court has adopted a broad test, the matter 
commonly ends up within the jurisdiction of the EU. The Court held in 
Société Technique Minière that if it is “possible to foresee with a sufficient 
degree of probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or of 
fact that the agreement in question may have an influence, direct or indirect, 
actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States”, the 
requirement is fulfilled.
112
 It can hardly be contested that, in restricting the 
freedom of action of the European football clubs, the Financial Fair Play 
rules affect trade between Member States. In light of the reasoning in 
Bosman, the Financial Fair Play rules most likely affect trade between 
Member States actually and directly.
113
  
 
It is also worth noticing that the de minimis limitation, according to which 
an agreement that does not have an appreciable impact on competition or on 
inter-state trade will not be caught by Article 101 TFEU, is not applicable to 
the Financial Fair Play rules. This is because in order to be subject to this 
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limitation, the market share held by the parties cannot exceed 10%, while 
UEFA is the only organizer of professional football in Europe.
114
 
 
Hence, it is clear that if the Financial Fair Play rules cannot be justified by 
the criterias of the Wouters test, they will be seen as a restrictive agreement 
within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU. However, they may then be 
exempted on economic grounds if they fulfill the conditions of Article 
101(3) TFEU.
115
 
 
4.2 The Financial Fair Play rules and 
Article 45 TFEU 
It is established case law that sport is subject to EU law in so far it 
constitutes an economic activity, that professional football players are 
workers within the meaning of Article 45 TFEU and that rules aimed at 
regulating gainful employment in a collective manner falls within the scope 
of Article 45 TFEU. It is also clear that this reasoning applies to rules 
adopted by sport governing bodies.
 116
  
 
The Financial Fair Play rules do not discriminate directly or indirectly on 
grounds of nationality. However, they do constitute an obstacle to the free 
movement of workers, since they may hinder a club from signing a contract 
with a player they would have signed a contract with if the rules were not in 
place.
117
 In other words, the Financial Fair Play rules would restrict a 
player’s right of free movement if the acquiring club could not recruit new 
labour due to the these rules.
118
 In this regard, it needs to be borne in mind 
that discrimination in so called “wholly internal” situations is not prohibited 
by Article 45 TFEU, which means that national workers cannot claim rights 
in their own Member State.
119
 The Financial Fair Play rules can therefore 
only be challenged under Article 45 TFEU by a football player who wants 
to sign a contract with a club situated in another Member State. 
 
Free movement of workers may be restricted on the justificatory grounds 
found in Article 45(3) TFEU, concerning public policy, public security or 
public health, and Article 45(4) TFEU, concerning employment in the 
public service. However, both of these provisions are not applicable in 
regard to organizational sport rules such as the Financial Fair Play rules.   
 
It is established case law that sporting rules constituting an obstacle to free 
movement of workers can be objectively justified.
120
 As discussed in 
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chapter 3.3, the test of objective justification is functionally similar to the 
Wouters test and therefore they will be applied together for the purposes of 
this thesis. However, in this regard it has to be borne in mind that 
infringements of the free movement of workers cannot be justified by 
considerations of a purely economic nature.
121
 This is in line with 
established case law in regard to the other freedoms under TFEU.
122
  
 
4.3 Objective justification/the Wouters 
test 
In order to determine whether the Financial Fair Play rules restrict 
competition within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU, the principles 
established in Wouters will be applied. The same principles will also apply 
when determining if the Financial Fair Play rules fulfill the objective 
justification grounds in relation to Article 45 TFEU, regarding free 
movement of workers. Determining factors are: the overall context in which 
the rule was adopted or produces its effects, and its objectives; whether the 
restrictions caused by the rule are inherent in the pursuit of the objectives; 
and whether the rule is proportionate in light of the objective pursued. 
 
4.3.1 Legitimate objective 
It is obvious from previous chapters that the Court has taken into account 
some special characteristics of sport when assessing whether sporting rules 
have legitimate objectives and that it usually relates to the organization and 
proper conduct of competitive sport.
123
 However, when also taking into 
account opinions on the specific nature of sport in decisions by the 
Commission, its White Paper on Sport, Member State contributions in form 
of declarations, European Parliaments Reports and statements from sports 
stakeholder, the meaning of these specific characteristics get more clear. 
Some examples are “the mutual interdependence of the sports market, the 
need to ensure solidarity between participants, the need to ensure the 
regularity and proper functioning of competitions, the need to encourage the 
training and education of young players, the need to promote stadium 
attendance and participation at all levels and the need to ensure fairness and 
the integrity of competition”.124 
 
In the so called White paper plus, the Commission stated that “in team 
sports, club licensing systems offer a valuable tool to ensure the integrity of 
competitions. They are also an effective way of promoting good governance 
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and financial stability. The Commission welcomes the adoption of measures 
aimed at enhancing financial fair play in European football while recalling 
that such measures have to respect internal market and competition 
rules.”125  
 
An even stronger statement was recently issued by the Commission and 
UEFA in the Joint statement on UEFA’s Financial Fair Play rules and the 
EU State aid Policy, stating for example that the principles underlying the 
Financial Fair Play rules “could serve…as an effective model for other 
sports facing similar financial challenges”, that “the “break even” rule 
reflects a sound economic principle that will encourage greater rationality 
and discipline in club finances and, in so doing, help to protect the wider 
interests of football” and that the objectives of the Financial Fair Play rules 
“are also consistent with the aims and objectives of European Union policy 
in the field of State Aid.
126
  
 
Naturally, these statements do not in themselves mean that the Commission 
considers the Financial Fair Play rules compatible with EU law. However, it 
does seem that the Commission considers the objectives of the Financial 
Fair Play rules to be legitimate in the context of organizing a pan-European 
football competition, at least in regard to the competition provisions in 
TFEU. Considering that the Court of Justice of the EU has previously given 
weight to the specific characteristics of sport, it will most likely also 
consider the objectives of the Financial Fair Play rules as legitimate. 
 
A complication when determining if the objectives of the Financial Fair 
Play rules pursue a legitimate objective in relation to Article 45 TFEU is 
that a restriction of the free movement of workers cannot be justified by 
considerations of a purely economic nature. There is no doubt that some, or 
even most, of the objectives of the Financial Fair Play rules, are of an 
economic nature, but as we have seen above, there are a wide range of 
objectives pursued and depending on which objectives the Court emphasize, 
they might nevertheless be considered as legitimate. 
 
4.3.2 Inherent 
The restrictions caused by a sporting rule must be inherent in the pursuit of 
its objective. As described above, the Court found the penalties at issue in 
Meca-Medina to be inherent for the organization and proper conduct of 
competitive sport and the healthy rivalry of athletes. Also, the Commission 
has found the prohibition on the ownership of two or several sport 
clubs/teams competing against each other to be inherent for ensuring the 
uncertainty of results and maintaining the integrity of the competition. Other 
examples of inherent rules are the so called “rules of the game”, such as 
rules determining the number of players on the field.
127
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Regarding the Financial Fair Play rules, it is clear that they limit clubs 
freedom of action by restricting them from spending. The question is 
whether such a restriction should be considered inherent in the pursuit of 
legitimate objectives such as ensuring the integrity of competitions, 
promoting good governance, safeguarding financial stability of clubs and 
leagues and encouraging longer term infrastructure investment
128
 when it 
might be argued that the problem is the overspending by badly run clubs?  
 
This question cannot be answered with great certainty. For example, the 
restriction caused by the Financial Fair Play rules can hardly be compared to 
the restrictions caused by the “rules of the game” but a comparison with the 
anti-doping rules in Meca-Medina may not be unreasonable. Therefore, the 
conclusion must be that it is possible, but by no means certain, that the 
Financial Fair Play rules will be considered inherent in the pursuit of its 
objective. However, since the major downside of the Financial Fair Play 
rules is that they will significantly reduce competitive balance in football, it 
might be hard to argue that these rules do not actually manage to fulfill their 
objectives, since competitive balance is not one of them. 
  
4.3.3 Proportional 
Finally, it needs to be determined whether the rule is proportionate in the 
light of the objective pursued. Once again, Meca-Medina is a relevant 
example in this regard, as the Court concluded that the threshold of the 
banned substance was not disproportionate and that the rules did not go 
beyond what was necessary to ensure the proper conduct of competitive 
sport.
129
 
 
The most noticeable stage of the proportionality inquiry is to determine 
whether the rules at issue are necessary in order to achieve the legitimate 
objectives, or if there are less restrictive alternatives available. In this regard 
it has been argued that neither empirical evidence nor theoretical research 
supports the need for regulation in form of the Financial Fair Play rules in 
order for the European football clubs to stop engaging in the destructive 
behavior of overspending, since the empirical evidence is inconclusive and 
the theoretical research is unclear in some key parts, such as what drives fan 
interest.
130
 However, these observations were made before the UEFA 
licensing regulations demanded the clubs to comply with the Financial Fair 
Play rules and either way, such findings cannot be seen as conclusive 
evidence that the Financial Fair Play rules are not necessary. Likewise, the 
improvement in certain economic categories of the economy of the football 
clubs since the Financial Fair Play rules were implemented cannot, at least 
yet, be seen as conclusive evidence that the Financial Fair Play rules are 
necessary.  
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As for determining whether the Financial Fair Play rules are the least 
restrictive measure available, there are several other cost control measures 
or other measures that need to be considered. These include for example 
absolute salary caps, luxury taxes, reducing club compensation and revenue 
sharing.
131
  
 
The introduction of luxury taxes on transfer fees in European Football has 
actually been promoted in a recent independent study on transfers in sport 
that was published by the Commission. However, the study also supports 
the Financial Fair Play rules.
132
 In regard to introducing a luxury tax as a 
less restrictive measure than the Financial Fair Play rules in the context of 
pan-European football competitions it does seem highly questionable 
whether the legitimate objectives the Financial Fair Play rules pursue would 
be achieved. Luxury taxes aim to increase competitive balance and research 
show that they succeed in that aim at the price of increased total salary 
payments.
133
 Also, luxury taxes do not stop clubs from excessive spending, 
it just makes it more expensive. 
 
As for absolute salary caps, they are more restrictive than luxury taxes but 
they also seem more likely to achieve the legitimate objectives of the 
Financial Fair Play rules, even though their main objective is competitive 
balance. Research has shown that under certain circumstances, mainly 
where fans have a high preference for competitive balance, they may have a 
positive impact on competitive balance, club profits and social welfare. 
However, there is also stated in the same research that “the labor relations 
approach employed by the hermetic American major leagues is not feasible 
within the European association-governed pyramid” considering the market 
heterogeneity and stakeholder diversity of European Football, and that “the 
only workable solution in the European context seems to be a percentage-of-
revenue payroll cap”.134 In the context of cost control measures relating to a 
pan-European club competition, this seems like a valid point. 
 
Another suggested alternative is to reduce the compensation for clubs 
participating in club competitions with the purpose of decreasing the 
incentive for clubs to overinvest in order to qualify for said competition. 
While this could be a reasonable action in itself, it is not remotely close to 
achieving the legitimate objectives of the Financial Fair Play rules. 
 
As for revenue sharing, research show that it enhances competitive balance 
since the small-market club will increase its investment level relatively more 
than the large-market club.
135
 As with the action of reducing club 
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compensation, this measure does not by itself achieve the legitimate 
objectives of the Financial Fair Play rules. 
 
Also, it is so far too early to comment on the proportionality of the sanctions 
accompanying the Financial Fair Play rules. However, it is clear that the 
CFCB has an extensive range of possible sanctions to choose from and that 
the members of adjudicatory chamber should be competent to choose 
proportionate sanctions for potential breaches of the Financial Fair play 
rules, since it has two former judges of the Court of Justice of the EU 
amongst its members. 
 
The conclusions of the examinations carried out in this subchapter should 
not be held as absolute truths as it reflects the writers own opinion on the 
issues at hand and it is possible that the Court would adopt a different view. 
This is in line with the case-by-case approach promoted by the Court in 
Meca-Medina and a pre-condition for the writer being able to examine the 
proportionality of the Financial Fair Play rules. 
 
Also, it is worth noticing that even though the Court is unlikely to base its 
judgment on Article 165 TFEU, the Court did suggest in Bernard that the 
specific features of sport, some of which are listed in Article 165 TFEU, 
might affect its interpretation of the suitability and necessity of the rules.
136
 
 
4.4 Justification under Article 101(3) TFEU 
If a sport rule is found to be restrictive under Article 101(1) TFEU, it may 
still be justified and gain exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU. Such a 
justification is most likely to apply where a rule cannot be considered 
inherent in the organization or proper conduct of sport, and hence cannot be 
justified by the Wouters test, but the beneficial effects of a rule outweigh its 
restrictive effects. Following the Commission’s decision in the UEFA 
Champions League case
137
, it is likely that the grounds for exempting a 
sport rule must be located within the exemption criteria contained in Article 
101(3) TFEU. Thus, the reference to the ‘specific nature of sport’ contained 
within Article 165 TFEU should not be taken into account.
138
 The four 
conditions set out in Article 101(3) TFEU are cumulative, which means that 
the all need to be fulfilled in order for an exemption to be granted.
139
  
 
First, the restrictive agreement must produce some efficiency gains, such as 
cost savings.
140
 This condition seems to be fulfilled by the Financial Fair 
Play rules, since they should be cost cutting.  
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Next, consumers must receive a fair share of the resulting benefit, meaning 
that consumers must at least be compensated for any actual or likely 
negative impact caused to them by the restriction of competition.
141
 In 
determining if the Financial Fair Play rules fulfill this condition, it could 
first of all be questioned if these rules will cause any negative impact for the 
consumers? In regard to the economic effects, the answer is most likely no. 
However, it seems clear that the Financial Fair Play rules will reduce the 
competitive balance in European Football.
142
 Yet, it is also possible that 
consumers will not suffer in longer term as it reduces the risk of clubs living 
beyond their means and enter administration. This would also mean that 
consumers will not have to bail clubs out economically. 
 
Thirdly, both the restrictive agreement and the individual restrictions that 
flow from the agreement needs to be reasonably necessary in order to 
achieve the efficiencies and the restriction must be indispensable to the 
agreement’s objectives.143 In other words, it is a test of proportionality.144 It 
has been argued in the doctrine whether UEFA has a strong case or not in 
this regard.
145
 Also, in this thesis, the issue has been addressed in chapter 
4.3.3. 
 
Finally, the agreement should not lead to the elimination of competition in 
respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
146
 The Financial 
Fair Play rules should fulfill this condition as they do not result in 
elimination of competition. 
 
4.5 The Financial Fair Play rules and 
Article 102 TFEU 
For the purposes of applying Article 102 TFEU, it is necessary to define the 
relevant market, to decide whether the undertaking is dominant within that 
market, to determine whether it has abused its dominant position and to 
decide if there are any defenses available. Also, in assessing if an 
undertaking has abused its dominant position, it must be determined 
whether it has conducted any of the practices mentioned in Article 102 
TFEU but also if it has conducted exploitation practices harmful to 
consumers and anti-competitive practices harmful to competitors.
147
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As explained above, UEFA groups members and therefore constitute an 
undertaking within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU.
148
 Also, UEFA is the 
only organizer of professional football in Europe and are therefore dominant 
on that market.
149
 However, by adopting the Financial Fair Play rules, 
UEFA has not conducted any of the practices mentioned above, since they 
do not harm neither consumers, nor competitors. Therefore, the Financial 
Fair Play rules are not prohibited by Article 102 TFEU. 
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5 Concluding remarks 
Analyzing whether the Financial Fair Play rules are compatible with EU law 
is hard, since the lawfulness of rules issued by sport governing bodies need 
to be examined on a case by case basis and the special characteristics of 
sport needs to be taken into account. For example, it is in the nature of 
proportionality tests that the outcome of it includes some degree of 
uncertainty. One should therefore be vary of drawing definite conclusions in 
these matters.  
 
However, my assessment is that the Financial Fair Play rules are compatible 
with EU law. I believe that they would pass the Wouters test and thereby 
they would not constitute a restriction within the meaning of Article 101(1) 
TFEU. If that is not the case, I still believe that they would have a good 
chance of gaining exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU. Furthermore, the 
Financial Fair Play rules are not prohibited by Article 102 TFEU. Since I 
believe that the Financial Fair Play rules would pass the Wouters test, I also 
believe that they would meet the objective justification grounds regarding 
free movement of workers and therefore be compatible with Article 45 
TFEU on the same merits. If that is not the case, the possibility of 
justification would be exhausted and the Financial Fair Play rules would be 
deemed incompatible with Article 45 TFEU.  
 
Although the compatibility of the Financial Fair Play rules with EU law is a 
fascinating topic, it should also be borne in mind that a precondition for 
them being tried in Court is that they are actually being challenged. 
Considering that the process of drafting the rules has been conciliatory, that 
major stakeholders have been involved in the process all the way and that 
the rules seem to enjoy a wide support from stakeholders, one might think 
that the rules would not be challenged in the near future. However, just 
because you support the rules in theory it does not mean that you will not 
take action if you feel aggrieved by them. By the reasons stated above, I 
think it would be a bigger threat to the Financial Fair Play rules if a player 
decides to challenge them than if a clubs decides to do the same. 
 
The title of this thesis refers to the serious economic situation that the 
European football clubs are in right now but also to the ruling that arguably 
shocked the governing bodies of football the most, namely the Bosman case. 
Considering the effort and prestige that UEFA has put into the Financial 
Fair Play rules, it would be a major setback for them to if they have to 
abolish the rules. In this sense, it feels assuring that UEFA apparently has 
had continuous talk with the Commission, resulting in, for example, their 
joint statement. 
 
To summarize this thesis, I do believe that the Financial Fair Play rules are 
compatible with EU law but that it is problematic that they supposedly will 
not promote competitive balance. In that respect, I consider it a natural 
 36 
follow up question how the rules can be complemented with other measures 
in order to achieve competitive balance, while still safeguarding the open 
European model with, for example, promotion and relegation?    
 37 
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